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EXPERIMENTAL PRAGMATISM
IN THE THIRD GLOBALIZATION
JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW SCHOOL
jjdstein@colorado.edu
Pragmatism dominates contemporary legal thought, but knowing this isn't knowing so
much. Legal pragmatism means different things to different people, and as this essay agues,
minimalist and eperimentalist orms o regulation both share a broadly pragmatic sensibiliy about
law and democray. As a consequence, we need to tease out the various threads of legapragmatism
in the hope o distinguishing the pragmatisms that work from the ones that don't, or less
pragmaticaly, the ones that are justfrom the ones that are not. This knowledge /ill comefrom an
ongoing assessment of the political stakes imminent in the pragmatisms, and an understanding of
where and when pragmatists might have parted ways from their liberal roots. Of course, we may vegy
well want to kep these roots. But unless we know something about the new pragmatic liberalism,
and from whence it came, the interminable circles of tired discourse against which we use our James
and Dewe to rally, ill remain curiousjy unbroken.
1. INTRODUCTION
It's a tricky business setting out to say something meaningful about long
swaths of history, if not a silly one. When we find ourselves wanting to argue how a
particular idea had a special purchase at a particular moment amidst some
population, trouble's surely on its way: How concrete is the idea? Who actually held
it? Why did it matter? Were they elites, and if so, why is a focus on elites so
important? What about the social history of the idea? What about the effects of the
idea on the ground? Were they less or more important? How did the effects play
themselves out? Universally? And what caused the idea in the first place? Is the
idea important at all, or should we focus on the material conditions in which the idea
arose? Why do we care?'
So yes, intellectual history is tricky business, but as the early Pragmatist
philosophers taught us,' we needn't fear the briar patch if the trip's worth our while,
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and in this case, I believe that it is. In this essay, I follow the intuition that one type
of such history-the mapping of American Legal Thought-is a tremendously
fruitful project, and look to locate a still obscure though surely ascending mode of
legal reasoning known as "experimental pragmatism."4  Though there are several
maps to choose from,5 my methodological point of departure relies on Duncan
Kennedy's analysis in his "Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought."'
In that work, Kennedy argues that since the US Civil War, lawyers, judges,
and policymakers in the United States have been participants in three phases of a
global legal consciousness. Each phase globalized, Kennedy explains, at times
representing the movement of legal ideas from Europe to the US, and at others in
the reverse. The first globalization involved the transmission of "classical" ideas
from Europe to the US, the second globalization involved more of a back and forth
cross-Atlantic movement of "social" legal ideas, and the third globalization, in which
we are now living, holds the United States at the core. What is helpful to understand
about the map is that not everything that is happening now is necessarily indigenous
to the contemporary legal thought of the third globalization. If's better to think of
contemporary legal thought as a style or aesthetic than a period of time, such that we
may very well see contemporary jurists operating in the mode of, say, classical legal
thought, just as contemporary musicians might perform in a style that was for more
popular a hundred years ago.
The immediate question is therefore whether experimental pragmatism is a
contemporary style-a style of law and policy that we would recognize as indigenous
to the present moment. In the discussion that follows, I will cautiously answer this
question in the affirmative. Unlike the unusual fashionista intent on wearing a 17f
century peruke to the corner coffeeshop, experimental pragmatism appears to be an
established aspect of the administrative landscape. Thus, if we have a map of
contemporary legal thought without a spot for experimentalism, then it probably
should. More importantly, experimental pragmatists like Charles Sabel and William
Simon seem committed to the use of an eclectic regulator approach, along with a
broadly "liberal" view of social welfare, both of which are hallmarks of the
contemporary mode of the third globalization. Consequently, the essay will conclude
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with a finding that experimental pragmatists are natives in the third globalization,
even if they display extraordinary affinities with workers in the second.
Before moving on to the story of the three globalizations, and the place of
experimental pragmatism in that story, if's important to underline the importance of
the effort. One value in play is the value we place on understanding our legal world.
To the extent we are able to do it well, mapping the structures of legal reasoning
enables us to see coherence where we once saw chaos, and the rhyme of doctrinal
choice if not the reason. More importantly, however, is the connection between
mapping and the urgent need for reform. This connection reveals itself in two ways.
On the one hand, the rooting of a particular mode of legal thought in its
political and social context assists in the important work of unsettling our received
expectations about the provenance of our beliefs. When we recall the bloodied
origins of classic liberalism, the terrible choices at stake in the shift to modem
liberalism, the weird and chilly emergence of neoliberalism, and the Willy Wonka
world that seemed to make treats out of them all-when we recall these contexts we
bring focus to the political stakes in the various styles of our contemporary
administrative expertise. On the other hand, mapping experimentalism on the
terrain of American Legal Thought gives us a handle on what to make of its
reformist potential. Unless we know something about the styles against which
experimentalists and everybody else implicitly situate themselves, we cannot know
whether we are repeating history, repeating renewal. The effort to locate
experimentalism on the map helps us to understand the political stakes in play, as
well as to know whether it is really something new. These are values we all should
find desirable, and in answering the question of where experimentalism fits in the
third globalization, we are in their service.
2. Two MODES OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
The First Clobalizaton: Classical Legal Thought. In what has become an
increasingly standard way of looking at the map, we can begin with what Duncan
Kennedy has coined "classical legal thought" ("CLT") or classical legal
consciousness.8 In Kennedy's usage, legal consciousness is framed in the language of
semiotics, where a consciousness is comprised of langue and parole.9 The langue
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consists of fundamental elements of the consciousness its mode of reasoning, its
conceptual vocabulary, and the like. In contrast is parole, which consists in the actual
speech-acts, the legal arguments themselves that are spoken in the mode of the
langue. Thus, while parole is indeterminate within the context of the structure of the
langue, the langue itself is identifiable as a discrete set of ideas.
According to Kennedy, the langue of CLT is a combination of three big ideas:
(1) individualism, (2) a strict separation of the private sphere of the common law
rules from the public sphere of coercive state regulation, and (3) a strategy of judicial
interpretation known rather infamously as formalism." Taken together, Kennedy
described the basic mode of reasoning in CLT as "the will theory,"" which I might
also characterize as a distillation of classic liberal legalism.' To get a feel for this
style, it might be helpful to recall John Locke's argument about property rights and
freedom of contract in his Second Treatise of Government.'
3
In Locke's version of the state of nature, people possessed certain natural
rights as a matter of their membership in the human race. These rights were
fundamentally about individual freedom, and as a consequence, they were rights that
clearly distinguished the "individualized" human being from the world of Aristotelian
political animals. Individuals were morally autonomous, subject to no higher
authority to which they had not consented. In this natural state of free and equal
individuals, market transactions evolved. Because people have natural ownership
over their persons, they also have natural ownership over the labor their bodies
produce. Once that labor is mixed with a good, the good logically becomes that
individual's property. As property-owners, intelligent individuals tend to buy and sell
their goods for a profit. Thus, in Locke's state of nature things were pretty swell,
except for the fact that a person's property was never really very secure. So, in order
to actually create a market order, Locke believed it was necessary to legalize property
and the trade of property, or freedom of contract. As a result, Locke argued for a
deliverance from the state of nature into a political society wherein the chief end of a
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The three elements of Kennedy's model of classical legal thought are vividly
illustrated in this famous little story. The actors are highly individualized in the sense
that we are working after the major break with Aristotelian ideas about the function
and purpose of human beings; society is split into a pivate sphere of pre-political
(and pre-legal) natural rights and a public sphere of arbitrary government and law;
the work of jurists in the public sphere are tasked with the enforcement of those
natural truths born in the private sphere but that are only realizable once they have
been legalized. To be clear, Kennedy is not suggesting that CLT was operating as
early as the 17' century, for in fact he doesn't see it as emerging as a recognizable
style until after the Civil War. With a reign of more than half a century, CLT as a
form of legal consciousness began its slow decline towards the end of the Nineteenth
Century, and was finally branded as a gauche style of legal analysis by World War 11.'
The Second Clobalization: Social Legal Thought. In contrast to the high
individualism of CLT, this new mode of legal analysis, which Kennedy calls social
legal thought, or "the social," involved a different set of ideas about how to use law
as a means for arranging the social world." The langue of social legal consciousness
involved ideas about social interdependence, the application of technical expertise to
the resolution of social problems, a preference for public administration over free
competition, a wider appreciation of civil and political rights, and judicial strategy of
purposive interpretation that sought to generate legal conclusions on the basis of
perceived social needs. Thus, where jurists operating in the CLT style would often
seek the resolutions of legal disputes via direct deductions from the natural truths of
the private, pre-political sphere, jurists in the social style would more generally look
for answers by asking questions about the social function of a given legal regime.'
Once we knew what a law was supposed to accomplish, and when we know whether
we wanted it accomplished that way, we could only then go on to say whether a legal
dispute should be resolved in one direction or another.8
In the same way that the langue of CLT might be characterized as a classic
style of "liberal legalism" ala Locke, the langue of social legal consciousness might be
characterized as the crystallization of "modern liberalism."'9 Modern liberal legalism
does not have the same sort of canonical representatives as classic liberalism, but its
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shortage of Olympian authorship is made up for in the staggering breadth of the
writing that has been done in its service. A likely candidate for the master of the
modern liberal style is Keynes,2" but representatives are available from both the left
and the right of the Keynesian emphasis on welfarism, administration, and
employment.2' Indeed, Frank Knight, a founding member of the Chicago School,
and Henry Carter Adams, one of the early writers in the first wave of institutional
economics, have much in common with respect to a new role for law-a role that
would stand in deep tension with judicial commitments to the will theory.
22
Let's take two examples of social legal thought, one from the Supreme Court
and one from the academy. In the Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Shelly v.
Kraemer23 the topic was restrictive covenants: the capacity of property owners to
prospectively determine to whom their land could, and could not, eventually pass.
The controversial aspect of these covenants, however, was that they excluded the
possibility on the basis of race. After a black family took ownership of a home that
had been subject to a racially restrictive covenant, a neighboring family brought an
action to enjoin the purchasers from taking residence. The Missouri Supreme Court
agreed with the neighbors and held the covenant to be effective and enforceable. In
approaching the question, the court was appropriately modest as the modem style
would indicate: the majority did not hold all private agreements to have the color of
state action, even though our notions of "bargain" and "ownership" would be
meaningless in the absence of some constituting legal regime.24 Thus, the division
between the independent market and the regulating state still held firm: "restrictive
agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed
to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those
agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear
clear that there has been no action by the State and the provisions of the
Amendment have not been violated.,2 That dividing line, though it would hold, was
nevertheless about to take a beating: "But here there was more. These are cases in
which the purposes of the agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by
state courts of the restrictive terms of the agreements.26 Voluntary agreements
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between individuals seeking to buy and sell land, the court explained, did not
implicate the state. The judicial enforcement of those agreements, however, did.
Several beliefs common to social legal thought are here: (1) free competition
in the market can have morally repugnant results; (2) government needs to intervene,
aggressively if need be, to counteract those tendencies if the market is to be
sustainable; (3) some amount of space, necessarily left undefined, should be left to
the natural sphere of the market. Shelley brings it home: the court was deeply
troubled by the social consequences of an unchecked property/ contract matrix with
respect to racial inequalities; the court argued for a more "realistic" view of the state,
which definitively exercised its power not only through the executive and the
legislature, but through its courts as well; the court still managed to carve out an area
where the state was believed absent.
On the academic side we might take the corpus of work from Harold
Laswell, Myres McDougal, and later W. Michael Reisman, or what was more
colloquially known as "McDougal & Associates," as illustrative. Like many others of
their generation,27 Laswell and McDougal were post-realists in the sense that they
were deeply informed by early 20 century attacks on both the liberalism and
formalism of classic legal thought. That is, they were convinced not of only of the
morally unacceptable nature of laisseZ-faire, but were equally certain about the
intellectual bankruptcy of formalistic thinking about law and policy. Legal realists,
and those like Laswell and McDougal who were working in the early wake of the
realist onslaught, were all beholden to the emergence of American Pragmatism.
28
The hand of John Dewey, for instance, is explicit in the work of famous realists like
Felix Cohen and Walter Wheeler Cook,29 as well as in the tremendously influential
work of Laswell and McDougal .
Laswell and McDougal's "Policy Perspective" steadily developed over the
course of the 20 century as what is probably best understood as an international
variant of the legal process school. At bottom, the idea was to take many of Dewey's
insights and elevate them beyond critique and into institutional form. This new
institutionalism would be guided by the freshest of cutting edge thinking about real
social problems, the functional nature of law, an understanding of the deeply political
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nature of law, and a process -oriented program in which a legal regime would be put
under constant pressure for reappraisal due to persistent exposure to local instances
of problem-solving. In Dewey's fashion, the basic goals of the regime would be very
broad-in their case, it was "human dignity"-and the actual meaning of the goal
would only be discovered through practice, and not before it. The goal values could
be achieved only through "continuous reappraisal of the circumstances in which
specific institutional combinations can make the greatest net contribution to the
overarching goal.' To the extent that the goal might find itself manifested
differently in the specifics of various local contexts, these "varying detailed practices
by which the overriding goals are sought need not necessarily be fatal.. .but can be
made creative in promoting [our goals].32
Of course, given that Laswell and McDougal's approach became a school of
thought in its own right, it would be misleading to suggest that these were the
indelible hallmarks of the New Haven School, but at least in 1959, this much was
clear. In that year, Laswell and McDougal published one of the seminal tracts of
their new post-realist policy approach in "The Identification and Appraisal of
Diverse Systems of Public Order.,33  As mentioned, the fundamental point of
departure was premised on avoiding old debates about the distinction between law
and politics, or state and market. In order to bypass administrative hang-ups like
these, the new policy perspective required of its agents an open-mindedness whereby
"the institutional details of all systems of public order are open to reconsideration in
the light of the contribution they will make to the realization of human dignity in
theory and fact...,,34  The basic architecture involved a series of tasks for the
administrator: (1) orient oneself to the largest possible context of evolving social
processes;35 (2) develop an understanding of how local communities generate
expectations about the process of authoritative decision-making, whether these
decisions are located in the public or private sphere;3 (3) take a view of regulation as
a mixture of prescriptive norms, softer recommendations, the application of both
hard and soft norms, and an ongoing appraisal of the work of the norms at the
street-level;3' and (4) keep in mind the broader framework goal of furthering human
dignity, and in keeping with post-realist preference for process over rule, think of this
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goal as deliberately open-ended and as "a social process in which values are widely
and not narrowly shared, and in which private choice, rather than coercion, is
emphasized as the predominant modality of power."38
3. LEGAL PRAGMATISM IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT
The Third GlobaliZation of Law and Legal Thought. In his description of
contemporary legal thought, Duncan Kennedy has suggested that the present mode
of legal analysis consists in the transformed elements of both CLT and social legal
consciousness.9 That is, where we might be tempted to see a social antithesis to a
classical thesis, there is no synthesis to be found in contemporary legal thought.
There is no new, dominant set of ideas that can be contrasted with the ideas of
previous periods. Instead, we have the debris left over after the onslaught on CLT,
as well as the debris left over from the various critiques deployed against the social,
including those movements that emerged in the 1970s like neoliberal styles of legal
discourse in the form of the law and economics approach, neoformalist critiques
from within the discourse of modern liberalism, like liberal constitutionalism and
republicanism, and styles of critique attempting to stand outside of liberal legalism
altogether, like critical legal studies.
Consequently, Kennedy suggests that while contemporary legal thought lacks
a large integrating concept, we can nevertheless identify two basic and ultimately
contradictory kinds of Iangue: neoformalism, transformed from its origins in CLT,
and the balancing of conflicting considerations, transformed from its functionalist
origins in social legal consciousness. There is no end to the sorts of examples we
might choose to illustrate the combination of these modes of reasoning, and so to
take one at random, consider the U.S. Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Mede/in v.
Texas.4" The case was a famous and controversial one, dealing with the double
approach of the United States judiciary to the International Court of Justice's Avena
decision,4' and a subsequent executive order from US President George W. Bush
seeking to implement that decision.42 The dispute made its way to the ICJ via a
complaint from Mexico against the United States, in which the former claimed that
the latter had violated certain rights due to Mexican nationals under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. The ICJ ruled that US officials had failed to
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fulfill those obligations, and President Bush ordered the state courts of Texas to
review the conviction of the identified Mexican nationals in light of Arena.
43
The question before the Supreme Court was what to make of all this. After
sweeping aside the idea that the US Supreme Court was obliged to follow orders
either from the ICJ or the US President, the Court sought to independently answer
the question of whether the US had certain obligations under the Vienna
Convention, and in the parlance of the controversy, whether that treaty was self-
executing. The Court was split. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts made
a series of sharply defined neoforma/ist moves.
First, Roberts acknowledged the validity and efficacy of international law.
"No one disputes that the Arena decision... constitutes an international law obligation
on the part of the United States.44 Roberts made it clear that the relevant question
here was not whether international legal obligations exist, per se, but whether in this
case it was possible to deduce a directly effective legal obligation from any relevant
treaties regarding these Mexican nationals residing in Texas. This question, it turned
out, was easy. The majority's approach was this: Once the relevant texts are
examined, a court is obliged to follow a legal formula instructing it to search out any
language providing a private party with a right to enforce the treaty. Upon finding
such language, a court should determine that the treaty is directly effective in court.
Without the language, if's not. Roberts didn't find anything on point, and in the
absence of the operative words, the majority concluded with a third point: "where a
treaty does not provide a particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for
the courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their own., 45 This
conception regarding an important distinction between law-making and law-applying,
where the business of law-makers is necessarily ideological4 and the business of law-
appliers is objective, was further elaborated in Justice Robert's critique of Justice
Breyer's dissent.
In making an argument that has all the hallmarks of the conflicting considerations
approach, Breyer suggested that the presence or absence of certain language is totally
beside the point.4 In contrast to Roberts' focus on formal rules, Breyer's claim was
that the "case law suggests practical, context-specific criteria" that should be used to
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help a court decide whether a treaty was self-executing. Breyer's approach demanded
answers to a series of fact-based questions, such as the purpose of the treaty, its
historical and political context, and whether the treaty seemed more or less focused
on judicial application or not. Breyer recognized that these sorts of questions did not
yield "a simple test, let alone a magical formula."48 But given the actual and realistic
unavailability of a meaningful textual approach like Roberts', the focus on the
function of the treaty and the effort to balance all the extraneous factors is all a court
can really ever hope to do.
The majority was unhappy with this response. Justice Roberts argued that
Breyer's notions were notoriously ad hoc, indeterminate, incapable of actually
providing predictable guidance, and probably most important of all, "tantamount to
vesting with the judiciary the power not only to interpret but also to create the law."49
Neo/ormaism and Balancing Combined The Dominance of Legal Pragmatism. MedeZin
provides a good example of how the language of classic liberalism and modem
liberalism has been blended in the standard moves of our contemporary
jurisprudence. That is, as Kennedy rightly argues, the modes of reasoning that
defined classical legal thought and social legal thought have not been borrowed
wholesale from prior moments in the history of our jurisprudence. We have not
looked into the closets of our parents, and rallied at the sight of clothes thought
hideous by a former generation. Contemporary legal thought is different:
neoformalism is not the will theory, and the conflicting considerations approach is
not welfarist functionalism.
These insights into the present situation do not, however, require us to see
contemporary legal consciousness as only a pile of scattered debris. One possibility
is that there actually is a new integrating concept, a new langue that can explain and
embody the strange union of the transformed elements of the classic and modem
forms of liberal legalism. That integrating concept could be something called
"pragmatism.' '50
At this point, we should be extremely careful about how we use the word.
An immediate question is whether pragmatism is new, and at least on the account of
the relationship between Cook and Dewey, between philosophical pragmatism and
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legal realism, our intuition may very well be to say that pragmatism is hardly new at
all. Let us then disaggregate the term a bit in order to see if there is something about
pragmatism that is indigenous to contemporary legal consciousness.
A first category with which we can all feel comfortable is "philosophical
pragmatism." This is a pragmatism that holds itself out as a way of thinking about
epistemology, ethics, is/oughts, universals, consequentialism, and other standards in
the canons of moral and political philosophy.5' We also feel good about the identity
of the players, and especially about the role of the big three: Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James, and John Dewey. There may be less comfort when we start to think
about the availability of a body of work called "neo-pragmatist," but the nature of
the conversation is pretty familiar. It's a conversation about the likes of Richard
Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Stanley Fish, Jurgen Habermas, Richard Bernstein, and others
that have attempted to interpret the older generation of pragmatists in light of a
more particular theory of what philosophical pragmatism entails.52 One thing we can
say with comfort about either brand of philosophical pragmatism is that it is not
couched as a theory of law. To be sure, many of these scholars have applied the
prior work to legal questions, but if's always a matter of philosophy applied to law,
not pragmatism as a theory of law first.
5 3
In contrast to philosophical pragmatism is a second category, popularized by
Richard Posner.4 This is the "everyday pragmatism" in the vernacular. It is the
pragmatism that is constantly deployed in the newspapers, by pundits and
politicians.55 It is almost universally understood in the context of the United States
as a badge of honor to be known as a pragmatist. These pragmatists are against
ideology, against foundational theory, against theories of truth or right. They will do
what they need to do in order to get it done. Whatever works. Action-oriented
thinking. "Just Do It."'56 President Obama has consistently portrayed himself as a
pragmatist, and against ideology, in precisely the same way that his opponents on the
right do the same thing.5
Of course, there are many complaints about everyday pragmatism. One is
that it appears to have nothing at all do with its philosophical cousin. Among many
other things, philosophical pragmatism is explosive. For the believer, it renders so
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many propositions about the known world into fuzz. Everything opens up for the
serious pragmatist, where the saying of William James becomes a saying about
everything: "William James was so natural, there was no way of knowing what he'd
do next.,5 8 In this way of thinking, nature becomes a site of constant knowing and
unknowing, where little if anything can be said about the way things ought to be
done. It is an undeniably subversive approach to world order. In contrast, the
everyday pragmatist is a soldier in favor the status quo. She doesn't believe in a so-
called ideology, but she only wants to tinker at the margins, slowly and incrementally.
It' s a view of the world that basically takes it as it is, hoping to slowly make it better,
but knowing that it's already pretty good to begin with.
A third category of pragmatism is legal pragmatism, and it is legal pragmatism
that may offer us a language that can capture the modes of reasoning we see in our
contemporary jurisprudence. In terms of mapping legal pragmatism itself, there
appear to be several varieties.5 9 One is "eclectic pragmatism." Eclectic pragmatism
is easy to understand, since it is essentially the layering of everyday pragmatism onto
the problematics of legal discourse. Also, just as everyday pragmatism is alienated
from philosophical pragmatism, so is eclectic pragmatism. It is this divorce that has
led writers like Posner, Rorty, and Tom Grey to all make the claim for a legal
pragmatism "freestanding" of the work of James, Dewey, and company.
Before moving on to the other forms of legal pragmatism, the connection
between eclectic pragmatism and contemporary legal consciousness deserves another
word. After all, we might intuitively see a connection between the conflicting
considerations side of things and eclectic pragmatism, but what of neoformalism?
How does eclectic pragmatism ally with a style of jurisprudence which seems at first
blush to be in tension with the basic commitments of the everyday pragmatist?
In order to properly understand these questions, we need to distinguish
between the self-identified legal pragmatist as an individual agent, either in the guise
of a judge or administrator or whoever, and legal pragmatism as a form of legal
consciousness. In the first case, we can look to the works of scholars like Cass
Sunstein and Daniel Farber as representatives of an idea about a status-quo
jurisprudence, based on an attraction to context and an abhorrence towards grand
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theory and foundations. The work of law should be a law that works, solving
problems through an appreciation of economics, sociology, political science, and
whatever other forms of knowledge -production may help us steadily move forward
in the elaboration of a "better" law. In this sense, the eclectic pragmatist does not
seem readily susceptible to the dynamics of neoformalism and its attachment to
rights and right thinking.
When we recognize that eclectic pragmatism is also a sensibility, and not
merely a professional identity, this tension quickly fades. The average judge, the
average associate at a law firm, the average policy wonk, the average "American,"
doesn't hold the same sorts of quasi-consequentialist commitments of a Sunstein and
Farber. They are rather far more inclined to use whatever mode of reasoning will be
the most successful in achieving their given ends. This is the mindset in which it
becomes normal to hear big-firm associates, and even partners, talk of using critical
legal studies, when it wor /s to do so. It doesn't matter what critical legal studies, or
behavioral law and economics, or public choice theory, or human rights law, might
actually mean in terms of its political stakes. The only thing that maters for the eclectic
pragmatist is that they select the mode of reasoning, whether it falls within the Iangue
of formalism or the Zangue of functionalism, that wins. If it gets the client what he
wants, use it. If it gets a politician elected, do it. If it solves our ethical problems, try
it.
The notion that this form of legal pragmatism might constitute a
contemporary legal consciousness comes into view when we bring liberal legalism
back into the story. If classical legal consciousness was related to classic liberalism,
and social legal consciousness was related to modem liberalism, where is liberalism in
the legal consciousness that we have today?
Eclectic pragmatism instructs us on the merits of having lost faith in either
the classic or modem styles of liberal legalism. We no longer believe in the
dominance of the will theory as the way in which to understand the role of law in the
constitution of society, and we also no longer believe in the dominance of state
interventionism as the universal corrective. And in the light of eclectic pragmatism,
this is a moral good. In this view, faith in any particular liberal approach gets in the
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way of getting what we want, and getting what we want is what matters. The eclectic
pragmatist has most assuredly lost faith in either classic liberalism or modern
liberalism, which accounts for why contemporary legal thought consists in the
transformed elements of CLT and the social, and not just a blending of those elements.
But here's the key: the eclectic pragmatist has not lost faith in liberalism. Indeed, what
appears to have shaped up is a sort of "pragmatist liberal legalism" in which the jurist
is completely committed to the vocabulary of classic and modern liberals, but at the
same time denies the faith that classic and modern liberals had in the rightness of
their respective modes of legal reasoning. The eclectic pragmatist also has faith, but
it is a faith rooted in the rightness of liberalism, but not in any one of its
predominant modes.
Legal pragmatism thus sustains the paradoxical alliance between
neoformalism and policy balancing. It keeps the two going-without pragmatism,
we might very well see a different form of legal consciousness. If we weren't
committed to a crass vision of "what works," something else would be necessary to
justify the continuation of a much-maligned style of formalism. At the same time, it
is eclectic pragmatism that inoculates policy balancing from fatal critique. It is
pragmatism that makes it possible to say: "We do these things because they work,
not because they're right."
4. MAPPING EXPERIMENTAL PRAGMATISM
Legal pragmatism appears to involve three major threads. After eclecticism is
economic pragmatism and experimental pragmatism. I will pass over economic
pragmatism for the sake of space, but only take note that it is a style of pragmatism
that places a tremendous amount of weight on the norm of allocative efficiency,
while at the same time avoiding being just another name for neoclassical law and
economics. The champion of this style is Richard Posner." The rest of this essay is
focused on the third style of legal pragmatism, experimentalism, and it takes a recent
text from William Simon and Charles Sabel as a representation.6
In their most recent work on the topic, Sabel and Simon situate experimental
pragmatists against two rival styles of law and policy work.2 On the one side is the
well-known "minimalism" of Sunstein & Associates3 and on the other is what Sabel
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and Simon call the "command and control" model of administration. For Sabel and
Simon, minimalism is a new style of administration forged in the context of
contemporary legal thought as a corrective for the failures of the mid-century welfare
state. Though they do take minimalism as heavily focused on the neoclassical
conception of efficiency analysis and the advantages of market simulation, Sabel and
Simon do not equate it either with the neoliberal apparatus that emerged in the
1980s. Minimalism stands for something other than the free-market orientation of
neoliberalism or the "command and control" ethos of modem liberalism, trying to
take the good from both and shuffling their insights as needed. Minimalism is
skeptical about both the wisdom of leaving too much power and discretion to clearly
irrational market actors, but also leaving too much discretion to regulators who are
clearly subject to capture. Markets fail, governments fail, and minimalism is set to
offer a balanced approach to governance that understands both the strengths and
weaknesses of the modem and neoliberal styles. Without transcending either, it
recombines both in an attraction to the status quo, "static efficiency," more of a
market-based approach to welfare, and more of a government-based approach to
nudging market choices in the "right" direction.
Before going further, I should clarify that I take Sunstein's minimalism as a
stock example of the eclectic brand of contemporary legal pragmatism, and I will use
"minimalism" and "eclecticism" interchangeably. Depending on the text upon which
we wish to focus (and there are a lot of texts), Sunstein is either performing as an
eclectic pragmatist or an economic pragmatist. These do seem to be distinct styles of
legal analysis, and Richard Posner most clearly represents economic pragmatism,
while an obvious example of eclectic pragmatism is found in the writing of Justices
Breyer and Anthony Kennedy. Sunstein's minimalism seems to veer back and forth
between being more or less economically inclined, but regardless of whether we put
him in the camp with the eclectics or economists, there seems little doubt that he is
deploying a contemporary form of legal pragmatism.
As for the command and control model against which Sabel and Simon
contrast both minimalism and experimentalism, this model is of apiece with what I
have been calling the modern liberalism of Duncan Kennedy's period of social legal
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thought. Thus, I use "command and control," "modern liberalism," and "social legal
thought" interchangeably. In the remainder of this section the discussion will first
summarize the basic ideas of experimental pragmatism as worked out in Sabel and
Simon's "Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State." It will then
go on to ask whether Sabel and Simon's cartography seems right: (1) Does
experimental pragmatism deserve a distinct location in the terrain of contemporary
legal thought, or is it subsumed under the broader groupings of eclectic and
economic pragmatism? (2) Does experimental pragmatism provide us with a
distinctive break with the jurisprudence of modern liberalism, or is it best understood
as a throwback, an attempt to recapture a spirit lost?
The Basics. Sabel and Simon situate experimental pragmatism along two
dimensions, "Regulation" and "Social Welfare," which might grossly be characterized
as proxies for the "form" and "substance" of experimentalism, respectively. In
contrast to the minimalist habit of using efficiency as a chief norm in the crafting of
regulatory regimes, experimental pragmatists are keener on regimes guided by a
premium on reliability. In the literature on management heory, reliability is a term
of art, involving an administrative outlook where the hope is for managers and
workers to operate in an atmosphere where learning and adaptation to changing
circumstances is constantly fostered. Conceivably inefficient or non-optimal
eventualities are regarded as opportunities for growth, and the emergence of problem
areas or defects are absorbed into a perpetual process of reassessment and
reappraisal.
Sabel and Simon appropriately recognize that some might counter that
reliability concerns are simply concerns of a more-broadly conceived idea about
efficiency. But as Sabel and Simon explain, there does seem to be a real tension
between experimentalist techniques and efficiency techniques to the extent that the
economic pragmatist will be preoccupied with strong market signals like price, where
the experimental pragmatist is looking at a broad spectrum of signals, including those
that are weak, subtle, and deserve on-the-spot complex discretion. If too much
attention is paid to price, the focus on efficiency can undermine a regulatory
framework of reliability. For the efficiency-minded, cost-benefit analysis and regimes
COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW -Vol. 3
that create mock-markets, like tradable emission programs, the main driver is a static
assessment of price. Instead of a default openness to a host of varying sorts of
signals and norms, the efficiency paradigm generates a tunnel vision for simplicity
and short-term costs, which Sabel and Simon suggest is ultimately counter-
productive. Experimental pragmatists believe that our broadly defined goals,
whatever they might be, will best be served though complex responses with a view
for the long-run, and not the reverse.
As we saw in the work of Lasswell and McDougal, this kind of big picture
view is explicitly rooted in John Dewey's pragmatism. They write, "Experimentalism
takes its name from John Dewey's political philosophy, which aims to precisely
accommodate the continuous change and variation that we see as the most pervasive
challenge of current public problems. Policies should be 'experimental in the sense
that they will be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the
consequences they entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision
in the light of observed consequences...,,,64 Sabel and Simon understand this prime
directive as involving a perspective that at bottom rejects the idea that regulation
works best through the articulation of clear goals and the aggressive implementation
of those goals. The focus instead is on Dewey's notion of inquiry: the experimental
pragmatist is not too worried about precisely defined goals precisely because our
goals only come into focus in the actual process of doing, and not before the doing
has been done. Ifs just a mistake to set out a goal of optimizing a particular industry
since the notion of optimizing may very well fool the regulator into chasing
chimerical ideas instead of realizing, in the day-to-day, the intertwined twists and
turns of crisis and victory. Sabel and Simon write: "In the realm of uncertainty,
policy aims cannot be extensively defined in advance of implementation; they have to
be discovered in the course of problem-solving."
'6 5
For the experimental pragmatist, following Dewey, the first lesson requires
the establishment of a very broad framework goal, but a goal that must be open to
constant revision. That is, the goal should be allowed to change after we come to
understand the goal as it seems to present itself in the march of the routine. Next,
our policymaker or legal analyst at the center will want to devolve as much discretion
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as possible to local actors, since if's in the local that the routine is most clearly
understood. The local actors produce, record, compile, and report results as
regularly as possible back to the center, and together the local actors and the
administrators at the center coordinate and evaluate. The framework goals
themselves are periodically evaluated in light of the process, helping dissolve the
distinction between the initial "value" and the "facts" to which the value are
ostensibly applied-a distinction key to the work of economic pragmatists.
In the context of regulation, Sabel and Simon suggest that this approach
involves a structural design in which all the players, whether public or private,
whether at the center or periphery, are induced into a culture of self-reporting and
self-critique which will excel in the on-going work of getting done what we want to
get done that is absent in the mainstream. Another advantage is that it avoids the
critique of the welfare state which pointed to the inefficiency of the bureaucrat,
ultimately unable to get her hands on the information relevant to the deployment of
her apparent expertise. She could never know the market as well as the market knew
itself. In contrast, the experimentalist lives in a sea of data it just keeps on flowing
in, flowing out, frothing about: the local is on a par with the center here, as opposed
to the old idea of the interventionist state.
In the context of social welfare, Sabel and Simon push the conversation away
from the form of rule-making and towards its content. The minimalist apparatus of
experimental pragmatism will be helpful in certain issue areas, Sabel and Simon
suggest, "but the approach seems implausible or question begging with respect to
many of the most important problems."6 The crux of the assertion is that eclectic
pragmatists have failed to adequately take stock of the basic social changes in the
playing field over the last half-century. In order to properly figure out the role of
government in the distribution of wealth and resources (if that's even the right
question), experimentalists are in tune with the realities of 21' t century social
structures in ways that minimalists are not.
The reasons for this are plain. The minimalist approach to social welfare
involves the same approach as it did to regulation: it is eclectic, and based on a
scheme of constantly recombining the assumptions of modern liberals and
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neoliberals. The minimalist toolkit, as it were, ends around 1980. To be sure, the
minimalist approach of eclectic pragmatists represents an alternative to the command
and control model of modem liberalism, as well as the libertarian feel of the
Washington Consensus, but what is new about it is the eclectic mixing of the ideas-
not the arrival of a new image of market-state relations.
According to Sabel and Simon, the substantive proposals of experimental
pragmatists with regard to the proper role of market and state are not dated to the
1980s, but not because a new idea about political economy has emerged. If this were
the case, it might be an example of the old-fashioned distinction between fact and
value, goal and implementation. Instead, experimental pragmatists are current in a
way that eclectics are not because eclectic pragmatists have sought to adapt the
assumptions of the New Deal and the Washington Consensus to the present, instead
of leaving those assumptions behind in favor of finding our answers in the real world
of problem-solving. For example, Sabel and Simon explain how the basic points of
departure for New Deal thinking involved an architecture of social insurance built
around tax and transfer cash distributions and framed in terms of market-labor
relationships. The idea was to target the everyman-an able-bodied English-
speaking white male with a traditional nuclear family tracked into a job in which he'd
stay for forty years. Instead of grasping the fundamental changes in society with
respect to what kinds of people are now able to work, where they work, in what
languages they work, and so on, Sabel and Simon argue that minimalists have
"sought to preserve the New Deal emphasis on standardized, rule-defined cash
benefits while broadening the scope of both the social insurance and public
assistance programs."6 7 Minimalists, on this view, are behind the times.
In order to make law more functional and better attuned to social needs,
experimental pragmatists are eager to do away with presumptions from the past. The
policy approach of the experimentalist should be on the lookout for changing trends
and incorporate a close-up focus on "highly individuated planning, pervasive policy
measurement, and efforts to aggregate and disseminate information about effective
practices.,68 The mechanism, as already stated, is public participation. In a way that
distances itself from the pessimism of behavioral economics and resembles the
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literature on deliberative democracy, expenimental pragmatists seek out operational
plans in which local communities are leading the way in figuring out what is working
out through public sharing, thinking, and critiquing. These local efforts need to be
harmonized through a central system, but instead of the center giving the periphery a
set of rules about the role of the state in the market, local groups should be always
thinking about what is working best, for whom, and where.
Pragmatism, Realism, Liberalism. In this Section, I want to situate Sabel and
Simon's discussion in the context of Duncan Kennedy's map of American Legal
Thought. As has already been said, I take minimalism as a strong illustration of
eclectic pragmatism, which I have argued to be a motivating property in the "Third
Globalization" of contemporary legal thought. Sabel and Simon would likely agree
that minimalism is a contemporary posture, since they expressly articulate it as a
current alternative to the command and control style of modem liberalism. Similarly,
if they were to accept the premises of the Three Globalizations story, they would also
accept the idea that experimental pragmatism fits in the contemporary mode, given
that they see experimentalism as the other current alternative.
Just being an alternative to modern liberalism, however, is not enough to
merit a place on Kennedy's map. As we have seen, contemporary thought is a
combination of two left-over styles, namely, neformalism and balancing. As I have
argued elsewhere, eclectic pragmatism, including Sunstein's version of it, does seem
to capture a sensibility in which the jurist or policy expert is encouraged to shift
between form and function, truth and consequence, in whatever way appears to fit
the current need. What is new here is the accepted nature of the eclecticism-where
at one point we may have identified a dominant faith in an individual will theory, or
an expert bureaucracy, we now have faith only in the mantra of "doing what works."
While this may be a fair description of the minimalism in Sabel and Simon's
article, does it also capture experimentalism? Are experimental pragmatists similarly
committed to a consequentialist view of neoformalist/balancing techniques? What
distinguishes them from the eclectics?
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Of course, an articulation of just what it is that distinguishes experimentalists
from eclectics was the whole point of Sabel and Simon's article. To be sure, there
can be no doubt that there are real and meaningful differences here, and if it were
put to a vote between the two I would certainly be a card-carrying member of the
experimentalist party. But despite the operational contrasts, experimentalism and
eclecticism seem anchored in a broadly similar orientation that becomes more and
more clear when we take the birds-eye view. Consider the following.
First, Sabel and Simon appear intent on presenting experimentalism as an
administrative style that has already been planted. It's not a utopian vision of a world
yet to be-in fact, they argue that there has been "a fundamental policy reorientation
along experimentalist lines in the United States, the European Union, and elsewhere
since the 1990s... Some of the Obama Administration's most important initiatives,
including the Food Safety Modernization Act and the Race to the Top education
program, can only be understood in experimentalist terms."6 9  Indeed, there is a
growing list of examples of experimentalist work in the world to which Sabel and
Simon are supplementing, not starting from scratch. From Toyota to the US Navy,
EPA's Project Excel to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, developments in child
welfare reform to information trading at the WTO, experimentalist approaches seem
everywhere. Of course, Sabel and Simon don't want to go too far, and they are sure
to remind that experimentalism is in its infancy. It's young and unproven, but
operating in the here and now.
It is in this sense that minimalism and experimentalism therefore share a
common ground in that they are both a part of the contemporary landscape-they
are both practical, applicable modes of administration in the second decade of the
21' t century. Consequently, as experimental approaches become more prevalent, they
will likely take more of the blame going round, of which there is plenty to share. If
this is right, and experimentalism is a meaningful aspect of contemporary legal
thought, then an initial complaint might hold that Kennedy's picture of the Third
Globalization is incomplete. If the Third Globalization is a confluence of
neoformalist techniques and balancing approaches, and experimentalism is
something else, is the map wrong?
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I don't think that it is, and this leads to a second point about the common
ground upon which eclectics and experimentalists are working. Sabel and Simon
hammer home the idea that experimentalism is better than eclecticism, and in the
context of minimalist style of regulation their chief complaint is that minimalism just
doesn't work. They take efficiency as the grundnorm in play, and show how in case
after case a singular focus on efficiency, optimal performance, and the techniques
that make good on those norms like cost-benefit analysis and cap & trade are poor
performers when it comes to actually doing what the regulations hope to do. Sabel
and Simon explain how efficiency concerns undermine the fruitfulness of new
learning opportunities" and sacrifice better results for quicker results," while cost-
benefit analysis persistently gets the measurements of the costs and the benefits all
wrong, or puts too much emphasis on centralized decision-making procedures
unaccompanied by local assessments.2 Like cost-benefit analysis, Sabel and Simon
see problems with cap & trade also involving workability." These problems,
however, are problems at the margins. Sabel and Simon admit that cost-benefit
analysis and cap & trade techniques are valuable, and efficiency is a truly great idea.
They're just not as valuable as eclectics would like to think.
The upshot here is that the experimentalist critique of eclectic proposals
flows out of a set of premises shared by the eclectics. Sabel and Simon know this,
which again seems to suggest that they really do see experimentalism as part of the
common fabric of the time, and not as anything alien to it. In fact, Sabel and
Simon's critique appears to portray an eclecticism in itself, chiding minimalists for
being too preoccupied with a single norm at the expense of other norms which
might also be valuable, if not more so. Indeed, as discussed above, a strong sense of
eclectic pragmatism avoids any singular faith in a given approach, and to the extent
minimalism really is in orbit around one vision of the market, this would suggest a
more appropriate labeling of economic pragmatism, if not the neoliberalism of the
Chicago School. The bottom line here is that experimental pragmatism, at least in
the context of this one text, seems safely situated in the Third Globalization given its
attraction to a bevy of norms, including efficiency. Remember, theirs is not a critique
of efficiency, it is a complement to it.
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A third point regarding Sabel and Simon's mapping of experimentalism,
minimalism, and modem liberalism has to do with what they see as the proper fit
between law and policy and the social world they are meant to govern. Sabel and
Simon understand "the most pervasive challenge to current public problems" to be
"the continuous change and variation" in society,74 and that "experimentalist regimes
are especially well-suited for circumstances in which effective public intervention
requires local variation and adaptation to changing circumstances." Minimalists,
Sabel and Simon argue, continue to operate on the old and out-dated assumption of
modern liberalism (and/or neoliberalism), while experimentalism is precisely
fashioned to craft an administrative style that makes law responsive to today's social
needs.
It is here in Sabel and Simon's critique of minimalist social welfare proposals
that doubts creep in as to whether experimental pragmatism is indeed a
contemporary legal style. There is no doubt that an idea about making law
responsive to social needs is an emblem of contemporary legal thought, but it is well-
known that it is here only as a relic of social legal thought. Indeed, it is a juristic
technique that is more than a hundred years old at this point, and what may
distinguish experimentalists is their somewhat neo-realist 6 tenacity for a teleological
jurisprudence. Whereas the fit between law and social need is a part of every serious
policy program, experimentalists like Sabel and Simon don't see it as just a "part"-
if's key.
This central focus on changing social circumstance demands cognizance of
the relation between experimental pragmatism, realism, and the sorts of functionalist
projects found in the work of post-realists like Lasswell and McDougal. There's no
basis for thinking that the work of Sabel and Simon is merely a re-run of the work of
Lasswell and McDougal, because it's clearly not. But despite the differences, they
look more and more marginal when we focus on the nature in which both scholarly
duos build off a strong diet of Dewey, take a complex view of the relation between
law and politics, eschew sharply defined policy goals in favor of broadly-stated
framework goals that will be progressively defined through works of individual
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practice, and advocate the need for constant flows of information in an on-going
process of reappraisal.
So what? Should the filial relation between experimental pragmatism and
post-realist projects from the likes of Lasswell and McDougal encourage us to locate
Sabel and Simon in the bygone era of social legal thought? If the experimental
critique of minimalist regulation is clearly in the mode of the Third Globalization,
and its critique of minimalist social welfare policy is of apiece with the Second, what
to do?
A fourth point about Sabel and Simon's discussion of experimentalism,
minimalism, and modern liberalism might carry the day. In an article from 2004,
Simon discussed the relation between "legal liberalism" and "legal pragmatism."' 77 In
the context of the mapping at work in this discussion, Simon appears to equate legal
liberalism with modern liberalism: he associated it with a penchant for plaintiffs in
tort and civil rights cases, defendants in criminal cases, a pioritization of moderate
forms of equality and liberty, and a tendency to track the liberal-left side of the
political spectrum. Simon's liberalism clearly does not include, as a consequence, the
legalism of either Locke or Hayek. As for "legal pragmatism," Simon means for the
label to describe experimentalism, and while he does admit that there are various
breeds, his analysis is solely focused on the experimental style.
Simon's critique of liberal legalism is slippery. Coming from a deep baseline
in critical legal studies, 8 there is little doubt about the adversarial posture of Simon's
pragmatism. And the article is tided "the pragmatist challenge to legal liberalism"
after all. At the same time, however, Simon seemed to be going out of his way to
paint the critique as one coming from withbin liberalism. After surfacing some
common complaints from critical theory, Simon distances himself from them.
Noting that these critiques "remain important and, on some points, powerful,"
Simon's pragmatist approach would be "more grounded in the basic commitments of
political liberalism."' 79 Moving into the rest of the discussion, as a consequence, the
reader may have expected legal pragmatism as the coming of something like a
friendly amendment, and not as much of a radical overturning of liberal legalism.
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Towards the middle of the article, Simon addressed the issue directly. Simon
explained, "At the risk of overemphasizing the contrast, I have formulated and
organized the premises so as to emphasize their differences with Legal Liberalism. It
is debatable whether the Legal Pragmatist perspective is best seen as a competitor to
the Legal Liberalism that addresses itself to the whole field of lawyeing, or rather as
a complement that purports to be more appropriate to a range of situations but that
concedes as a significant range to the Legal Liberal approach."8 At the end, Simon
left this relational question for another day, wondering whether an ultimate answer
might be less useful than a forward-looking perspective on better discourse, whether
ifs called liberal or pragmatic or whatever.
Though I do admire Simon's cautious tone, and appreciate the complicated
nature of the question, I find it appropriate to come down with an answer here: Sabel
and Simon are liberals. Now, in saying as much I don't mean to identify them
necessarily as modern liberals working in the language of social legal thought, exiling
them from the terrain of the Third Globalization. Not at all. What I do mean to say
is that experimental pragmatism, like eclectic pragmatism, depends on a toolkit that
remains entirely comprised of the stuff of classic, modem, and neoliberalism. If, for
example, we were to join Sabel and Simon with Lasswell and McDougal, we would
expect to see the former pair joining the latter pair's unquestionable loyalty to the
modern liberal style. Sabel and Simon have lost faith in a single style of liberal
legalism, as have all natives of contemporary legal thought. And yet, while they have
no faith in any one style, their optimism is buoyed by a belief in the power of
deliberative democracy and the truth of the liberal, autonomous, rational self.
To sum up, there appear to be three reasons for believing experimental
pragmatism to be a representation of Duncan Kennedy's description of
contemporary legal thought. First, Sabel and Simon have argued that
experimentalism is operational, and therefore a real administrative style in the
contemporary scene. Of course, not everything that is happening is illustrative of
contemporary legal thought-a great many instances are just holdovers from
traditions in the past. But Sabel and Simon's claim is that it is indeed new, and that it
is explicitly formulated as an alternative to the command and control style of modem
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liberalism. Second, the experimentalist critique of minimalist regulation is clearly
consistent with an eclectic preoccupation with "what works," and for Sabel and
Simon, a great deal of the minimalist regulatory apparatus just doesn't. It wasn't that
efficiency concerns, cost-benefit analysis, or cap & trade programs suffered from
political or philosophical defects, but rather that they didn't perform in the manner in
which Sunstein & Associates would hope. Third, the experimentalist critique of
minimalist social welfare suggested a heavy reliance on the jurisprudential style of
social legal thought and modern liberalism. The reliance was so heavy, and so
important, that it was enough to doubt whether experimentalism might be better
located in the Second Globalization. Fourth, experimental pragmatism appears to be
ultimately committed to liberal legalism. This commitment is not to any single style
of liberal legalism, but rather to the common liberal vocabulary to be found in the
Iangue of classical and social legal thought.
As a consequence, a tentative conclusion would hold that experimentalism is
like minimalism in that they are both strands of the legal pragmatism animating so
much of contemporary legal thought. This is a legal pragmatism that is notable for
its attention to neoformalism, attraction to the weighing of conflicting interests, and
belief in the combination of various styles of legal liberalism in the service of what
works. Eclectic pragmatism, and its minimalist programs, is on all fours with this
description. Experimental pragmatism, in contrast, favors function over form and
deliberation over balancing. Experimentalism is therefore less central to the
dominant conception of contemporary legal thought (which is a good thing for
experimentalists), but indigenous to contemporary legal thought all the same: It has
more functionalism than minimalism, and less formalism, but it is similarly
committed to a pervasive if disenchanted liberalism.
5. CONCLUSION
Legal pragmatism is a dominating quality of contemporary legal thought, but
knowing this isn't knowing too much. Legal pragmatism means different things to
different people, and as this essay has argued, minimalism and experimentalism share
a broadly pragmatic sensibility about law and its administration. It is therefore
incumbent to tease out the various threads of legal pragmatism in the hope of
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distinguishing the pragmatisms that work from the ones that don't, or more
ambitiously, the ones that are just from the ones that are not. This knowledge will
come from an ongoing assessment of the political stakes imminent in the
pragmatisms, and an understanding of where and when we have jumped the liberal
ship.
Of course, we may very well want to stay on the ship-it certainly has its
benefits. But unless we know something about the new pragmatic liberalism, and
from whence it came, the interminable circles of tired discourse against which we use
our James and Dewey to rally, will remain curiously unbroken.
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